Skip to main content
Book Review Essay: “Anorexia, Jouissance, and the Contemporary Clinic” A Review of Domenico Consenza's "A Lacanian Reading of Anorexia"

Article

Book Review Essay: “Anorexia, Jouissance, and the Contemporary Clinic” A Review of Domenico Consenza's "A Lacanian Reading of Anorexia"

Abstract

This essay offers a selective engagement with Domenico Cosenza’s A Lacanian Reading of Anorexia, newly translated into English by Jonathan West and revised by Fernando Castrillón. Rather than providing a comprehensive overview, this text reflects on a few key threads that highlight the richness of Cosenza’s contribution to contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Cosenza’s work is a rigorous and clinically grounded exploration of anorexia, drawing from extensive theoretical research and his own vast clinical experience. The book revisits historical understandings of the disorder and situates anorexia within the Lacanian field as a structurally significant phenomenon—one marked by opacity, holophrasis, and a refusal of the Other through an enigmatic interplay with “nothingness’ that unveils anorexia, beyond metaphor, as a conduit for jouissance. Far from being a mere disorder of appetite, anorexia becomes, in Cosenza’s formulation, a paradigmatic symptom that speaks to our clinical present. It reflects the transformations within subjectivity under very late capitalism, where the symbolic law no longer serves as a regulating structure the body presents itself as the channel both for regulation and inscription. In this sense, Cosenza positions anorexia as an “Ur-symptom” of our time—one that stages the broader crisis of the symbolic order and calls for a re-elaboration of classical clinical coordinates in order to ethically engage with today’s subjectivities, which often attempt—desperately—to cohere within the very symptom that threatens to undo them.

Keywords:

  • Keyword: anorexia
  • Keyword: jouissance
  • Keyword: object nothing
  • Keyword: Lacan
  • Keyword: clinic of the real

How to Cite:

Haik, J. M., (2025) “Book Review Essay: “Anorexia, Jouissance, and the Contemporary Clinic” A Review of Domenico Consenza's "A Lacanian Reading of Anorexia"”, European Journal of Psychoanalysis 12(1).

One: Resignation Syndrome

A few years ago I stumbled upon the New Yorker article “The Trauma of Facing Deportation” by Rachel Aviv (2017). Aviv is a journalist who has long focused her reporting on the intersections of mental health, institutional power, and social crisis. In this piece, she reports on the children known as “the apathetic” who have fallen into what is now called resignation syndrome—a condition almost exclusively pertaining to the children of immigrant families seeking political asylum in Sweden, frequently fleeing war and persecution in places such as Syria, the former Yugoslavia, or Roma communities. The condition typically emerges after these children, or their families, receive a negative asylum decision or face imminent deportation; it appears to be the response to a life situation that enters its most vulnerable moment often following prolonged periods of uncertainty and bureaucratic limbo. Aviv reports that between 2005 and 2017, more than 400 children in their tweens and teens had fallen into this condition: a comatose state briefly announced by the child’s sudden absolute refusal of food and drink paired with the inability to get out of bed that quickly progresses into the realms of a medical comma. Most children need to be hospitalized or placed on life support at home as they become “totally passive, immobile, lacking tone, withdrawn, mute, unable to eat and drink, incontinent and not reacting to any physical stimuli or pain” (Aviv, 2017, para. 12). It is as if, through their withdrawal, de apatiska, seems to roll up the paradox of their condition in its naming: these children only seem apathetic, they are anything but… Through their falling too, they somehow manage to buy time to appeal and certainly open a place in the larger political discussion, bringing in both support and vehement opposition. Yet what remains a persistent enigma—worth sustained meditation—is how this “solution” is adopted: how do these bodies arrive at such a state, one so clearly, impossibly, outside of volition or mimicry? While accusations of manipulation are sometimes raised by immigration opponents, what remains almost universally agreed upon is the uncanny/nirvanic nature of the symptom itself—a virulent, “contagious” form of retraction as a response to an overwhelming social reality that not even the most attuned lama could produce.

The images Aviv (2017) evokes in her article have stayed with me for years, and while reading Cosenza’s (2023) work on anorexia, they were suddenly cast into a different scene. The children Aviv describes lie motionless in hospital beds or on sofas, eyes closed for weeks, sometimes months. Feeding tubes run into their noses, their limbs atrophy; they do not cry, flinch, or speak. They are not sedated. They have simply, and devastatingly, slipped away into a comatose state that presents a medical enigma, an enigma that was once posed by conversion, and that inaugurated psychoanalysis. Doctors remark how nothing hurts them: pinched, poked, turned with no response. They are described as beings that seem to have “fallen away from the world” as “an atmosphere of Michelangelo’s Pietá” (Aviv, 2017, para. 11) embraces them. The impression, Aviv poignantly describes, is not one of agony, but of something frozen, spellbound—suspended beyond reach, beyond time. They resemble, hauntingly, a Snow White quality: not yet dead but no longer fully alive. A purity of withdrawal, Aviv observes, so complete it borders on the sublime.

What Rachel Aviv (2017) describes—the disappearance of refugee children into their own bodies—resonates as a terrifying yet crudely coherent psychic response to the brutality of contemporary geopolitics. But it also evokes, with uncanny precision, the phenomenology of the anorexic symptom in its most acute expressions: the “deadly autistic anesthesia of the anorexic symptom” (Cosenza, 2023, p. 39), its monotonous chronicity, its ascetic push to a differed death. In common too, is that double dimension of the contemporary symptom that Cosenza so brilliantly works and re-works in A Lacanian Reading of Anorexia, where the symptom exceeds the classical dialectic of hysteria: the enigma of a message transmitted through the medium of the body, and then the message, diluted in the bodily drive to the point of its disjointedness with the unconscious.

Such a phenomenon calls upon the founding gesture of psychoanalysis itself: the clinical encounter with hysteria, with conversion, and the opaque enigma of the body to be clarified, made sense of. The dialectical dimensions at play—rather cryptic but clearly present in its complicity with discourse. The socio-political factors that the classic reading of anorexia is tied to and that underscore its contagiousness. In the case of de apatiska, most research circles back to the same elusive phrase: a culture-bound syndrome. A designation that explains little, whether in the case of Resignation Syndrome or anorexia, beyond the usual suspects—namely, the phallicization of thinness as a value of achievement, as a sign of control, ownership, or mastery over the body and the will as transacted values of our time.

In both cases, dialectically, we are confronted with a silent dialogue with the Other—with culture, with language, with the images and codes upon which the social bond is erected. What stays enigmatic, nevertheless, is the paradoxical and contradictory ways in which this conversation carries: how these children, perhaps precisely because they had so much hope
bound up in language, in being bound by it, manage instead to fall radically out of it. Falling out of time, out of speech, and into a space of precarious ex-sistence.

A Lacanian reading of anorexia will thus enter the double fold realm of the symptom, it will avow its dialectical nature, but it will go further into contemporaneity, propped on the Lacanian paradigm of the new formations of the symptom into a clinic of the drive, a clinic of the real. In other words—this wordless conversation that lodges itself in the body, that finds a paradoxical stabilization in the withdrawal into an autistic shell—that feels entirely contemporary and what Cosenza deals with in his elaborations through the grammar of anorexia. In a world in which the DSM has dropped the diagnostic criteria of hysteria and its vicissitudes and as the dimension of the classic form of the symptom seems to exceed the symbolic grids for psychoanalysis, Cosenza will elaborate on the anorexic’s encounter with jouissance, both in itself as a clinical matter but also as a paradigm for the paradoxical libidinal satisfactions characteristic of contemporaneity.

It is precisely at this juncture—the prescient, pressing presence of the body in contemporary symptomatology—that Cosenza’s work asserts its force. While A Lacanian Reading of Anorexia takes eating disorders as its clinical entry point, its conceptual reach extends well beyond. By situating anorexia within the grammar of the contemporary clinic—grounded in the paradigm of the new formations of the symptom and their fetishistic use of the object as a condenser of jouissance, often culminating in what Cosenza (2023) calls “superegoic therapies” (p. 7)—he opens a broader horizon: that of the clinic of the unconscious, intersecting with the clinic of the Real, or the clinic of jouissance. In this context, the anorexic “solution” appears as the subject’s flight from division—as the nirvanic experience of the symptom as mastery and rapport. The clinic of anorexia, then, becomes an entry point into the clinic of the symptom in its desubjectivized form.

Drawing from a rich compendium of theoretical research, historical framing, and over three decades of clinical experience, Cosenza rolls the enigma of anorexia into a tightly knotted object and hurls it from multiple angles. First, anorexia as a dialectical syndrome within the many orientations of psychoanalysis; then, anorexia as a subjective position—also dialectical, though marked by its anti-dialectical inflection within the Lacanian context; and finally, anorexia as the paradigm of contemporary “solutions” within what Lacan theorized as the discourse of the market, and its paradigmatic place within late capitalism. A Lacanian Reading of Anorexia, thus, is broader than its title suggests as Cosenza’s explorations place a steadying finger on what so often escapes us: the elusive coordinates of the clinic today, where symptoms—classically read as metaphors—now point to a “beyond the signifier” within a clinical setting marked by the thinning of symbolic scaffolding, and where the Real insists through the body as an avenue of inscription of the subject within today’s impossible grammar.

In Cosenza’s reading, to approach anorexia today is to approach something that demands, as strange as it may sound, the kind of epistemic modesty Niels Bohr invoked when describing electrons: not matter, not energy, but both—and neither—depending on the moment of observation. So too with the anorexic subject. The symptom is not a fixed content, but a tell-tale organization—stable only in its orbit around objects far more ambiguous than those typically encountered in psychoanalytic theory. It is neither wholly dialectical nor entirely anti-dialectical. It must be grasped, if at all, within the precise timing of the subjective logic of the particular inhabitance that the symptom maps out.

Cosenza thus takes us by the hand through the lenses of his lifelong research: the Neo-Freudian, the systemic, the Lacanian… and with each turn of the screw, certain elements of his reading persist, while others shift in contrast with clinical findings, historical research, and the interventions he has himself enacted. He unfolds both the dialectical, historically workable aspects of anorexia—its classical statute as symptom, as plea, demand, or metaphor, interpretable, displaceable, and as something that can be elaborated upon—even when that demand is made paradoxically, through its radical refusal of the Other. An aspect of the symptom that despite its contradictions, remains, in this mode, workable.

To this dialectical aspect he contrasts an extra dimension, the “beyond,” the enigmatic core of anorexia that shines in the foreground with his extensive research on infantile anorexia—where the symptom appears severed from symbolic exchange and rooted instead in the dyadic interplay between m(Other) and child. Here, the symptom points to a dimension of nothingness over existence, of jouissance beyond meaning pertaining exclusively to a Lacanian reading.

What the apathetic child might wrap in their “re-belle indifférence,” in their rebellious abstinence from the world, Cosenza develops through anorexia as a layered construction: there is a dialectical dimension to the symptom, a purely bodily-Real register, and finally, a wall between treatment and symptom—an ego-syntonic closure, in which renouncing of food is satisfying another appetite, that of the sense of mastery, that of the narcissistic attachment to an identity with the symptom itself. “I am anorexic” thus lays down the wall for a symptom that refuses to be treated—as for the subject, her symptom is the (self) treatment.

Cosenza’s theses: In its function as a solution, anorexia solves for—in a singular and subjective way—an unbearable encounter with the Other. At its dialectical, interpretable level, it acts as a kind of diatribe, akin to that sustained by Job with God: a refusal both issued by and directed toward the Other. Expelled from the land of unity with God in his many losses, Job enters in a saintly yet demonic confrontation, a sustained war, sarcastic, despairing, ragefully, demanding recognition.

Yet Cosenza draws our attention to another dimension—one that resists intervention altogether. In the radical bodily resignation of infantile anorexia or in states of profound apathy, we encounter a symptom that no longer asks to be decoded or resolved. It is not a new dimension, but one that comes to the fore and presents itself not as something to be cured as the symptom shields that subject from division—there is no dissonance, there is, an enigma without an enigma. A purely bodily formation, it makes no demand, situates itself outside the symbolic, and carries an anti-dialectical core: the radical enigma of bodies caught in autonomic circuitry, orbiting around an “object nothing.”

This is the symptom that no longer argues—as Job does—but exits the scene entirely, lodging itself in the body’s jouissance, beyond meaning. By tracing anorexia back to its infantile formations, Cosenza opens the clinic to a topology of the drive that eludes full interpretation, yet remains ethically legible. Radical refusal here is not just defiance—it is the architecture of a protective bubble, a self-enclosure within the One. The body folds in on itself, issuing no demand: neither to be fed, nor to be touched.

Through this other level of the symptom—the silent, anti-dialectical, autistic-adjacent, auto-destructive orbiting—a defining trait of the contemporary clinic is brought forth. One that appears in the compulsions of toxicomania, in the imaginary omnipotence of the anorexic, and more discreetly—but more pervasively—in the cultural tendency to regulate lack through achievement, mastery, and bodily discipline. A libidinal organization of life through the constraints of ritual, bodily practice, measurement, and self-policing. Cosenza highlights how young subjectivity, increasingly, bears internal conflict on the surface of the body—suggesting a shift in which inscription is no longer symbolic or psychic, but practiced from the outside in. It marks a particular shaping of our era of “extimité,” in which the boundaries between private and public, metaphor and act, become hard to recognize: one observes, with growing frequency, internal phantasmagorias brought to the surface—tattooed across the skin. The many nuances in self-inscription attest to the shift of the symbolic and opens the clinical field to the question of new symptom formations. In this light, Cosenza’s text emerges as a clinical compass—or more broadly, a compass within the disoriented discourse of unregulated jouissance as he renews the powerful tool that psychoanalysis keeps being for reading the subject.

Two: The Child Eats Nothing.

“The anorexic child,” Lacan says in Seminar XI, “eats nothing” and Cosenza underscores this paradox: the anorexic does eat—but she eats “nothing”. The anorexic is not refusing food, but feeding herself nothing: the rumbling cumulus of negatives implies a positivity connected to Cosenza’s core proposal—that anorexia is not a symptom, syndrome, or constellation of traits, but a solution. This solution, in its positivity—albeit a pathological one—marks a fundamental departure from prior orientations, especially those he constantly revisits, like Bruch and Selvini Palazzoli, the founding mothers of the clinic of anorexia, who framed anorexia as a deficit ego, a maneuver within the family system in a rejection of the relation to the caregiver, this is, in the symptoms’ negativity.

Cosenza will place anorexia as an unconscious response—a response to something structurally unbearable in the subject’s relation to the Other, beyond the familiar framing of anorexia as a weaning or separation issue within the mother–child dyad. While acknowledging Bruch’s emphasis on the maternal conflict—an emphasis that is clinically prescient—Cosenza pushes past the classically dialectical reading of the symptom: beyond the hysterical metaphors of the plea-as-refusal, beyond family dynamics as the dominant interpretive grid, and beyond interventions focused exclusively on unconscious meaning or the oral drive.

Cosenza remains aligned with the understanding of anorexia as a pathology of relationship, framing the future anorexics tendency towards complacency in front of the enigmatic, uncanny, captivating or desubjectivizing desire of the Other. Based both on his lifelong research and his clinical observations, he rearticulates the relational terms themselves. The mother becomes beyond the imaginary dyad, a subjectivizing/desubjectivizing function: of speech, of sustenance, of gift, both engulfing and depriving that morphs into the position of the Other. In other words, Cosenza reworks the relational matrix as the subject’s impossible, unbearable, encounter with the (m)Other.

Crucially, Cosenza draws on what Bruch and Palazzoli had already intuited: that the anorexic is not simply deaf to interpretation due to narcissistic omnipotence, but has—intermittently or profoundly—fallen, defensively, out of the semantic realm altogether, ambiguously breaking with the dialectic of the Other through a two sided coin as her “no” is both a plea and a wall. Since “no” is the minimal condition for subjectivization and the point of entry into the logic of desire, the future anorexic has trouble managing her articulation as a subject in front of demand and desire. In her difficulties with the no, any attempt to reclaim her desire introduces her into the realm of “too muchness.” The inability of a regulated, subjectivized “no” as the reverse face of desire articulates itself in a surplus tone and through the language of food in its metonymic ties with the Other. She becomes, in a way, a terrorist—as her refusal peels her away from any relational matrix, generating a true opacity for the spectator: the anorexic will endlessly ruminate around food, what is taken and not organizes her affectively in a true detachment from the symbolic matrix, this is, under the condition that whole relational game is played through the morsels that she desperately desires but cannot accept.

Mute and opaque, Cosenza’s anorexic is an acute reader of the creases and foldings, the interplay and dynamics of desire—in terms of the desire of the Other, she is not willing, vehemently refuses, to play the game at that level, thus producing her own world with its set rules and regulations that fall very far away from the law of the Other. It is not, therefore, beyond “a weakness of the ego” as Bruch argued, but more so of an unconscious that has taken the subject into an escape artist’s trip from the metaphorical weight of being and the very real weight of desire. Following Miller and Laurent, Cosenza says, in a sense, the question of anorexia can be the radicalized question of the hysteric:

Anorexic refusal as a radicalized version of the hysterical “no” … the refusal of food is presented as a maneuver “essential to the subject to show that he exists outside the omnipotence of the Other” (Miller, 1998, p. 222). From this perspective, anorexia is on the side of the barred subject; it is more “on the side of separation” than alienation in relation to bulimia; and one can even wish to say, according to Miller, that anorexia is “the structure of every desire” (Miller, Laurent, 2005, p. 378). This thesis, which proposes anorexia as a radicalized clinical embodiment of desire, we could say as “pure desire” but also – in a definition that shows its deadly effect at work – as a “terrorist” which goes toward death in the name of the ideal of an angelic body (Miller, 2001, pp. 162–163), a contemporary figure of Antigone, seems to us to enter into tension with the definition of anorexia proposed by Miller himself as “refusal of the Other.” (Cosenza, 2023, pp. 77–78)

Cosenza’s central thesis is aligned with Miller’s proposal that the anorexic’s “refusal of the Other” moves anorexia away from the field of hysteria. Propped on his wide and deep research into the various “clinics” of anorexia—from the clinic of the founding mothers, the Tavistockian tradition, and the systemic family approach and the traditional Lacanian reading—Cosenza underscores a crucial point: anorexia is libidinally organized around rejection and that singular logic of refusal is the only stable element that can reveal the subject’s structure.

Cosenza highlights Agustin Menard’s efforts to articulate a cohesive theory of anorexia, while also engaging with other innovative approaches central to the contemporary clinic—particularly the contributions of Recalcati and Nieves Soria. His attention spans wide, from the psychotic and autistic qualities reflected in anorexic behavior and the role of holophrastic stereotypy, to Soria’s emphasis on the refusal of semblance and the foreclosure of imaginary nomination. These strands converge around what Cosenza (2023) terms a “fruitful aporia” (p. 82), centered on the tension between two dimensions of the symptom: on one hand, its dialectical function, and on the other, an autistically oriented dimension organized around a radical refusal of the Other. This latter aspect reveals the subject’s rejection of the law of the Other and their withdrawal from the social bond, in favor of preserving a mythical jouissance—a non-divided, omnipotent position that often pushes the caregiver to the brink.

The ambiguity in the anorexic’s belligerent separative/adhesive maneuver emerges, in Recalcati’s terms (as cited in Cosenza, 2023) –the separation-counter alienation– that holds the subject simultaneously at a distance from desire and yet non-separated from the first object of satisfaction—the jouissance of the mythical mother, recuperated/hallucinated through a unity with “nothingness” that functions as a shield or a veil between the anorexic and any form of loss.

Cosenza scaffolds his thesis through a reconstruction of the conceptual “flow” running through Lacan’s sparse, often elliptical remarks on anorexia across the span of his teaching. This effort allows for the articulation of the logic underlying the symptom’s core performative gesture, and for a mapping of the structural coordinates that this refusal responds to. The anorexic’s radical “no” is thus traced through four distinct positions Lacan assumed throughout the evolution of his thought. In the process, what emerges is not only a reading of anorexia but also an implicit masterclass in Lacan’s theoretical development, curated around the traces of a single signifier.

Cosenza takes off with Lacan’s earliest comments in “The Family Complexes” from 1938, where—still under Kleinian influence—the young Lacan conceives of anorexia as a refusal of weaning, a resistance to separating from the maternal rapport. This position, Cosenza notes, Lacan later abandons, only to return to it much later in his teaching, but reframed: not as a clinging to the maternal imago, but as a drive toward unity with the One—the omnipotent, seamless rapport that retains the trace of the maternal, is now articulated through Lacan’s critique of the discourse of the markets and its emblematic rejection of lack. The maternal is that which bears the quality of the mythical One in its unifying omnipotence as the anorexic hermetically alienates herself from the demands, the contradictory exigencies of the Other in its many consistencies: the very solidly unified Others in the religious anorexias, the caricaturesque Others in our age of symbolic pulverization that mandate “self” control and ownership of the drive—the compound of contemporary rituals around the discipline of the body.

But between these two poles—the very tangible maternal Imago and the layered structure of the One in contemporary discourse—Cosenza identifies Lacan’s structuralist phase of the 1950s, where the symbolic order is central. At this point, anorexia is interpreted within the dialectical framework of hysteria in its radical dialogue with the Other. Crucially, Lacan introduces a new object—the “object nothing,” which becomes the organizing element with which the anorexic addresses/rejects the Other, and although in Seminar IV (Lacan, 1956-1957/1994) refusal retains its dialectical function, the introduction of the object nothing lends the symptom new symbolic density: it is not a real or imaginary object, but a purely symbolic one that allows the subject to position herself—or not—within the dialectic of desire.

This epistemological shift is traced through the 1960s, particularly in Seminar X: Anxiety and Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, where Lacan places the Real at the center of the clinic, and the unconscious is no longer reducible to the signifying chain alone. With Lacan’s reintroduction of the drive into psychoanalytic theory, the function of the object nothing also changes. “The anorexic child eats nothing” becomes a statement saturated with multiple logics.

From this vantage point, Cosenza elaborates a clinic emerging from Lacan’s later work: a clinic of jouissance that may originally stem from the logic of the signifier but that evolves into operating outside of the laws of meaning. Anorexia is no longer simply hysteric speech turned inward but also reveals itself as a stubborn, monochromatic, and enigmatically stabilizing orbit around a Real nothing—a symptomatic anchoring in refusal, as “the other side” of desire itself. Of this anchoring, organizing effect of bulimia, Maria Hornbacher (1998) retells in her memoir:

It is at once temping, seductive, terrifying. It divides the brain in half: you take in, you reject: you need, you do not need. It not a comfortable split, even early on. But early on, its pros seem to outweigh its cons. You have a specific focus, your thoughts do not race as much. They stay in orderly row: go home, eat, throw up. The problem in your life is your body. It is defined and has a beginning and an end. The problem will be solved by shrinking the body. Contain yourself. (p. 42)

It is this stabilizing function both of refusal and the object nothing that centers Cosenza’s elaboration. This object nothing, a precursor to the metonymic chain of desire, opens the clinic of anorexia as an extended inquiry into the clinic of desire itself. Through the anorexic’s enactment, the object nothing, central to the understanding of the contemporary clinic, becomes both visible and graspable: a full object, without loss, engulfed by the body in an attempt to evade division and establish an absolute, mythical, omnipotent rapport. “Control thyself”: the anorexic is the visual enemy of desire because she experiences desire as dystonic and voraciously aberrant. In terms of tropes, hers is the sinecdoque: taming the body is taming desire, saying no to food is staying out of the Other’s equation… In Hornbacher’s (1998) words again:

What I am about to say is tricky, and it is a statement about my own relationship with bulimia and anorexia .… Bulimia acknowledges the body explicitly, violently. It attacks the body, but it does not deny. It is an act of disgust and of need. This disgust and need are about both the body and the emotions. The bulimic finds herself in excess, too emotional, too passionate. This sense of excess is pinned to the body… the bulimic impulse is more realistic than the anorexic because, for all its horrible nihilism, it understands that the body is inescapable .… The anorectic operates under the astounding illusion that she can escape the flesh, and, by association, the realm of emotions .… At some point, the intensity of my passion for life, the erotics of childhood, the natural hungers, and the instinctive childhood response to sate those hungers, became my greatest fear. My mind, my body, began to terrify me. I was an uncontrollable child. I could not, not matter how I tried, control my mind, its forays into distant realms, its dark curiosity. The depth and breadth of my imagination became a threat unto itself. Passion is strange. Mine is fierce and all encompassing, a fiery desire for life. When I was a child, I knew it was there, I lived it, a tendency toward explosion, flames, noise. This side of passion was my first perversion. The tendency toward excess veered out of control into bulimia, that state of fear and desire, the violent crashing back and for the between hunger and the abortion of hunger, between taking and throwing back what is most needed and instinctively desired: food. The bread of life. (pp. 93-94)

Refusal—understood as part of a wild, maddening, dysregulated logic of a solution—marks a subjective position in its own right in Cosenza’s reading, one that may present with shades of hysteria, perversion, or even psychosis because it brushes against all of them, belonging more precisely, as Aviv (2017) beautifully places it, in the realms of the pathetically sublime.

Refusal, in Cosenza, amounts to a logic that operates on many levels: as metaphor, as defense, as an attempt for separation, and as pure jouissance of the body in its control over the drive, which is a symptomatic ideal of our times. Through the four functions of refusal Cosenza demonstrates how the positivity of the solution is enacted, laying the ground for a clinic that not only addresses the dialectical aspects of the symptom but fully engages with a new clinical horizon: a clinic of the Real, of jouissance, of the drive-body.

Refusal, in Cosenza’s formulation, is far more than oppositional behavior or the byproduct of ego weakness. It is a complex, composite formation in which negativism and compliance are intricately grafted together—a singular strategy the anorexic subject deploys to navigate massive, unsolvable contradictions. She both defies and submits in her proclivity for complacency, revealing a psychic geography fractured between two poles: an absent, blind to singularity, evacuated Other and an excessively demanding, jouissance-driven, ever-engulfing Other. Her refusal oscillates between passive withdrawal and active negation—a letting go that is at once militant and hollow.

There is a fundamental tension—one that is marked not only by defense, but, more importantly for the purposes of any possible treatment, is a singularly crafted subjective position. In her bloody battle with the drive, the anorexic reveals how the drive is the synecdoche to her desire. What emerges is a two-pronged logic: refusal operates both as a shield and as an existential declaration. The ambiguity at the core of her position—defiance entwined with submission, separation fused with adhesiveness, emptiness linked to mastery—plastically translates into the anorexic mortal equation: to feed, to accept the logic of the Other, is to die not biologically but subjectively. This sinuous, paradoxical path charts her tortured roadmap to desire.

Yet these contradictions fracture the subject, producing intolerable tensions that are managed only through cycling into jouissance—that painful enjoyment derived from the ruthless mastery of the drive. In this way, the symptom takes on a life of its own, acquiring a Frankensteinian autonomy. Within this closed circuit, recovery becomes unbearable: it is equated with symbolic reinsertion into the castrating, unintelligible, and thus unlivable law of the Other—experienced by the anorexic as death itself. To take the symptom from her, in the logic of her endless synecdoches, is to take the part for the whole; the removal of the symptom becomes the erasure of her very mode of being in the world. Feeding equals death.

Cosenza’s reading is, above all, an ethical reading of the anorexic symptom. Conceiving the symptom as a solution inevitably renders treatment less viable within the dominant “evidence-based, functional paradigm”—a model that prioritizes measurable outcomes and remains ill-suited for what cannot be quantified or standardized and probably impossible to justify to an insurance company. Yet he is unequivocal: what is at stake is desire itself, and any attempt at normalization—any “faux cure” that aims to rein in the phenomenology of the symptom—risks causing irreparable subjective loss. The only road then, if one is to preserve subjectivity over the normalization of bodily function, is the titanic task of re-establishing the subject’s singular desire, with its full weight, as an acceptable way of living:

Our idea of the cure for anorexia nervosa, and this is our seventh thesis, in line with an analytical orientation, does not correspond to the idea of a normalizing and adaptive orthopedics of anorexic negativism. This normalizing therapeutic perspective enters into collusion, at the moment of its realization, with the other phenomenological side of the anorexic symptom, that of the superego ideal of the conformity of a false Self where the subject is suppressed by the obligation to respond in an adhesive way at the request of the Other, whether parent or caregiver. (Cosenza, 2023, p. 6)

Attention is drawn then, into to all the therapeutic strategies that pursue an orthopedia that bolsters and colludes with that aspect of the anorexic symptom and its heavy superego ideal that conforms with the very discourse that prompted much of the anorexic’s suffering in the first place—and that speaks to the clinic of the “object nothing” in its dual nature, this is, as both the signifier that drives the metonymy of desire and “the real object” embodying enjoyment without lack. Under this logic, any cure would require the recalibration, the threat of this (non)relation. What Cosenza will demonstrate, beyond orthopedia, is the real possibility of moving the subjective position from its original proclamation: “I am in full control.”, through which she elevates herself above desire, need, and consumption and outside the symbolic altogether. It is a delicate dance the analyst shall make, one that involves the matrix of love rather than knowledge in the analytic transference as the analyst shall carefully destabilize, poke a hole into the symptomatic fullness, the firm position she inhabits: She wants nothing, she needs nothing—she feels full.

This slim entry point into this logic is articulated through the four distinct, yet interwoven, functions that refusal may perform for the anorexic subject: as metaphor, substituting within the field of signifiers; as defense, shielding the subject from the invasive jouissance of the Other; as pseudo-separation, carving distance from an engulfing Other; and as jouissance itself, producing paradoxical satisfaction through the absolute control of the drive. These four functions reveal how the positivity of the symptom—a function that poses a singular solution—is hermetically, impermeably, enacted.

Refusal as metaphor, in its first and dialectical function, operates as a displaced, unconscious demand for love—a rectification of the unbearable position the Other occupies in relation to the subject. It draws a boundary, asserting a separation while simultaneously begging for difference: a differentiation between demand as satisfaction and demand as gift—above all, the gift of love. Refusing, then, is also a form of asking. It inscribes the irreducibility of desire in the field of demand. Within the hysterical matrix, the anorexic’s refusal becomes a metonymic substitution for the desire of the Other. Her fantasy of disappearance poses the unbearable question: Does he want to lose me? In the analytic transference, this often emerges as a threat of withdrawal—a temptation to interrupt treatment precisely when symbolic work begins. Refusal, at this level, becomes an unconscious demand for interpretation, asking to be read even as it expels meaning. It is, in this, dimension, Job’s diatribe with God.

From a Lacanian-Millerian perspective, refusal is primarily, the refusal of the Other: “…the rejection of the Other, in particular of the nurturing mother and more broadly the rejection of the great Other” (Miller & Laurent, as cited in Cosenza, 2023, p. 78). This refusal has a double genitive structure stressed by Miller: the Other who refuses the subject, putting the subject in the position of waste through what Recalcati calls the “grimace of the Other” (as cited in Cosenza, 2023, p. 87) that has its effects in the mirror function. But also, the subject who refuses the Other, rejecting its contradictory or overstuffing, asphyxiating desire. Whether it’s the maternal Other, the symbolic Other of discourse, or the market-driven Other of performance and consumption, the anorexic confronts a devastating question: Does my refusal matter more if I live or if I die? Her act, also, becomes a dent in the Other’s jouissance, the anorexic here tries to dent the Other, many a times the parental Other, unconsciously aiming to rectify the impossible position she has been summoned to occupy in relation to their desire. A gesture that haunts the Other with the weight of her disappearance but that undoubtedly aims to regulate her (non)relationship by acting where she cannot argue herself out, many a times, while asking from the Other for a gift of love he cannot give. In this dialectic dimension refusing is a way of asking, a way of maneuvering like playing closed poker with the card of desire.

Refusal, in its second function, is also a defense—marking a crucial transition from the symbolic into the Real. In this sense, refusal is not about signification but protection. It shields the subject from the invasive jouissance of the Other—from appetite, from sexual maturation, femininity, the vicissitudes of sexuation itself as it stages a disappearance in front of the sexuated gaze. The anorexic, is known, does not lack appetite; she defends against it. She might feed others, displace her own desire, or refuse her body image entirely—revealing a dysmorphia rooted in a house of mirrors she has been thrown into. For Cosenza (2023), this dimension reveals a structural divergence: hysteric anorexias anchored in the phallic clinic versus more radical cases belonging to what he terms the “clinic of the object” (p. 76). In the latter, the absence of the Name-of-the-Father blocks the sexualization of the body entirely, producing a radical exit from any semblance tied to sex. In this context, refusal is not just self-erasure; it is an evacuation of the Other’s invasion and a form of psychotic defense.

In its third function, refusal functioning as separation expresses the anorexic’s desperate push for autonomy from the Other—a modality of severance from the very dependency that defines her. Cosenza draws on Miller’s formula of the refusal of the Other to describe this closure of the symbolic register. The symptom becomes an autistic retreat into a jouissance without law—a kind of purified One, untouched by the symbolic castration that defines subjectivity. The anorexic thus, strives to be the non-divided subject: without desire and thus without lack. Yet, this withdrawal is relational too: a disorder of linking and unlinking. The anorexic oscillates between total dependence and total autonomy—eating everything or nothing, clinging or detaching. This all-or-nothing mode reveals the fragility inflicted by separation, and the analytic task becomes one of crafting a new, singular path of separation—one that tolerates lack without collapsing into emptiness. As Cosenza notes, “the anorexic dreams of separation without loss” (p. 106) and her symptom stages this impossible ideal—an effort to differentiate without severing, to subtract without mourning.

Lastly, refusal as jouissance reveals the most enigmatic—and contemporary—kernel of the symptom. Here, refusal becomes not only a defense against jouissance but its very source. The anorexic’s discipline, her tyrannical superego, generates satisfaction through asceticism, through the demonic refusal of the body’s needs—even to the point of injury, hormonal collapse, or death. In this libidinal economy, the “no” becomes a thick, dense affirmation of her de-subjectivization: she is a subject to no one. Cosenza (2023) calls it a “libidinal thickness”, (p.91) a jouissance that in its renunciation, strangles life. But most interestingly, refusal preserves desire in a paradoxical form—keeping it circulating, unfulfilled, yet sustained. But there is also a non-dialectical layer: a mute, addictive relation to nothing itself. This is no longer a symptom that says “something;” it says, precisely “nothing.” Many aspects of anorexia bypass metaphor entirely, as it is not only a signifier at play here but beyond it, a knotting, a structural solution to an unbearable encounter with unboundedness that is packed into the symptom as an identity which becomes fixed, to the point that anorexia becomes the subject of enunciation itself.

It is precisely here that Cosenza’s text becomes most pertinent for our times as the jouissance of the full object “nothing” is the eternal banquet that tames the Other’s demand. The object nothing becomes the site around which the anorexic libidinally organizes her days and ways, knotting the chaos and its anxiety into the regime of the small, carefully calibrated, paper thin slivers of meat—an autistic organization that refuses to be inscribed in the field of the Other’s meaning creating a bubble of “self” sufficiency that acquires a dimension in itself.

The object nothing, thus, becomes a nodal in its double status: on the one hand, as a support of desire—sustaining desire through its absence in a dialectical, hysterical logic—and on the other, as a real object that carries jouissance in its bare form, organizing the subject’s modes of enjoyment. Lacan’s remarks on this paradoxical object are paired, contrasted, and expanded by Cosenza through the clinic of infantile anorexia, particularly in dialogue with the work of Irene Chatoor, Fernandez Blanco, and Francois Asermet. His aim is to specify the Real value of the object nothing from the vantage point of the infant’s pre-symbolic position, where this object acquires its full clinical untainted weight.

Through a sustained exploration of infantile failures to thrive, Cosenza lays bare not only the relational dimension of feeding and its usual suspects—the failure of the maternal function, the absence of reverie—but also offers crucial distinctions between weaning anorexia, oppositional and passive anorexia, and the open question of autistic modes of non-relation. The asphyxiating presence of the Other, the refusal to thrive as a defense against distress, and the limits of symbolic intervention are discussed in relation to the object nothing as the centrality of meaning of displaced. And so, Cosenza’s punctuations on infantile anorexia ground Lacan’s statement—“the anorexic child eats nothing”—by clarifying how the orbit around nothing differs fundamentally from the operations of the objet a as the logic of refusal unfolds as a refusal not only of demand but of jouissance itself, situating the subject in a radically withdrawn and silent position with respect to the Other.

From the perspective of infantile anorexia, Cosenza sheds light on several crucial clinical implications: namely, that the “established” anorexic cannot be solely approached as a subject of meaning, but must also be approached as a subject of the drive—one whose symptom must be read not as metaphor but within the framework of a clinic of the Real. Drawing on the work of Soria and Dewambrechies-La Sagna, he treats infantile anorexia as a structural formation distinct from neurosis—as an organization centered on the drive rather than on phallic signification as refusal is a founding act that precedes entry into language.

This dimension of refusal-in-lieu of the symbolic, also situates anorexia also in the paradigm of the new formations of the symptom—a shift that marks a departure from the classical clinic, toward a Borromean clinic in which the symptom is placed at the center of a singular knotting of the three registers. The anorexic solution, then, functions as a way of knotting the unbound—stabilizing the subject’s terror of the unconscious and dread of the Other. Through her symptom, she recreates a form of artificial rapport, a guarded separation, a provisional cohesiveness sustained by her own orbit of jouissance: the universe of grams, restrictions, and measured rituals that obey a logic she hallucinates she has ownership of. In that enigmatic floating in one’s own egosyntonic bubble, the “self” imposed entrapments, the superegoic autotherapy, has severed her from the double movement of desire—as to desire is, of course, also to be desired. What is revealed here is the logic that sustains the enigma behind the anorexic’s horror with desire itself as seen in her impinging ruminations around food and the body—and how, faced with the thickness of desire, with its unbearable density, she certainly prefers to disappear.

Three: The Contemporary Orthopedia of Jouissance.                                                 

We lived in a larger world where there is also a sense of hunger and a sense of lack. We can call it loss of religion, loss of the nuclear family, loss of community, but whatever it is, it has created a deep and insatiable hunger in our collective unconscious. Our perpetual search for something that will be big enough to fill us had led us to a strange idolatry of at once consumption and starvation. We execute “complicated vacillations … between self worship and self-degradation” the pendulum swinging back and forth, missing the point of balance every time. We know we need, and so we acquire and acquire and eat and eat, past the point of bodily fullness, trying to sate a greater need. Ashamed of this, we turn skeletons into goddesses and look to them as if they might teach us how to not-need. (Hornbacher, 1998, p. 119)

In the contemporary clinical panorama, we are confronted with a series of collapses—not only political ones, marked by the contortions of bodies and minds in the context of migration crises and their contradictory imperatives, but also a deeper, more insidious unraveling: the weakening of the symbolic order at the very level of discourse itself.

In Strangers to Ourselves, Rachel Aviv (2022) memorializes and attempts to make sense of her own early encounter with anorexia (at the age of six), contextualizing it with the following reflection:

The French philosopher René Girard describes anorexia as being rooted in “the desire not to be a saint but to be regarded as one.” He writes, “There is great irony in the fact that the modern process of stamping out religion produces countless caricatures of it.” (p. 14).

Indeed, there is something profound to be said about the body and the discourse of the “caricatures” of the Other—the fragmentation of the symbolic coordinates that once structured the social bond. We encounter aberrant forms and spectral iterations of the Other’s gaze, the Other’s grimace—demanding, seductive, excluding—echoing in the surgically precise grids of contemporary discourse, with its matrix of inclusions and exclusions, aberrations and iterations in its call for a desire pulverized or amplified in distorted form.

The clinical correlate reflects this precisely: subjectivities struggling to cohere within an increasingly lax symbolic framework, in a discourse that has declared war on loss or lack—one marked by a pervasive allergy to contradiction, castration, and impossibility. As Lacan anticipated in his 1972 Milan conference, the plague of contemporary discourse lies in a system that collapses the space for lack and therefore for desire—as its reverse side—through a perverse alliance between the master’s discourse and science. The result is an era, described by Byung-Chul Han (2010/2015), whose disciplinary core organizes the social bond through positivity: singular solutions for achievement that come to define the subject’s existence. Bruch herself (as cited in Cosenza, 2023, p. 46), in the 60’s underscores the value of achievement anorexia has for an anorexic, in Hornbacher’s (1998) words: an attempt “to become superhuman, skin thick as steel, unflinching in the face of adversity, out of the grasping reach of others” (p. 68).

Within what Recalcati—frequently cited by Cosenza—calls the “clinic of emptiness,” anorexia emerges as a refraction of the collapse of symbolic mediation, rooted in the decline of the paternal function and embedded in a broader post-Oedipal crisis. For Recalcati, (as cited in Cosenza, 2023) the anorexic subject, in her formative passage through the mirror stage, confronts the “grimace of the Other” and is effectively cast out of discourse. Deprived of the stabilizing force of symbolic primacy, she turns to the body as a desperate site of remediation, which supplements Eric Laurent’s conceptualization of anorexia as a body-event—a moment when jouissance erupts beyond the reach of metaphor, inscribing itself directly onto the body. This bypass of the symbolic marks a decisive clinical shift: from a model organized around meaning and signification to one centered on the Real, where the subject seeks a fragile stabilization not through language, but through the disordered and deregulated libidinal economy of the body itself.

Cosenza gathers these orientations under the broader category of the “clinic of the Real,” where what remains stable are bodies caught in the circuitry of jouissance. Marking a discontinuity from the classical clinic oriented toward semantics and hermeneutics, and aligning with a clinic of the drive, the anorexic articulates contemporary discourse more eloquently than any other formation: she enjoys through refusal, speaks through silence, and both catastrophically fails and perversely succeeds in enacting the dominant imperative of our time—the mastery of the drive and the fantasy of seamless rapport. This aligns with the two defining features of the clinic of new symptom formations: the emergence of the fetish as a disenchanted object-in-lieu of rapport, standing in for the lost or degraded relation to the Other; and, the rise of superegoic auto-therapies—self-styled attempts at regulation that proliferate as responses to the unbearable paradoxes of contemporary subjectivity.

Anorexia, in Cosenza’s reading, becomes a privileged vantage point from which to observe the subject’s relation to satisfaction, loss, and meaning in an era where symbolic law has buckled—offering a cipher for the wider disjunctions of discourse. As Cosenza anatomizes the logic of the anorexic’s walk—a passive, silent, perhaps deadly walk, but one that is patterned, legible, and structured by the tell-tale primacy of the body, he opens onto broader symptomatic formations: the proliferation of disciplinary practices, therapeutics, biohacking, self-tracking, and neo-tribalisms centered on optimization. These emerge as sites where inscription is attempted—where the body becomes the terrain upon which the anxieties of lack and desire are staged in response to the porousness of today’s unregulated grammar.

Such formations, structured as superegoic auto-therapies, resonate with Braunstein’s (2006) brilliantly succinct definition of the superego: “The superego is jouissance without desire, outside or instead of desire” (p. 269; my translation). It is in this spirit that we now circulate—playing out the tropes of satisfaction with nothing (in both senses of the word)—and find our libidinal solutions in the paradoxes of jouissance: the heavy satieties, the constraining freedoms, the appetite without hunger that turns the pleasure principle on its head.

In other words, this is the hypothesis that must be articulated here and put to the test in future research: contemporary anorexia nervosa leads us to question the status of the new symbolic order, different from the one that predominated in the classical period of the history of psychoanalysis, and to rethink its forms of constitution in the process of adolescent becoming. In this perspective, anorexia is no longer presented only as a position of refusal of the Other, but also as an extreme gateway that contributes to illuminating the impasse and the specificity of the current condition of the subject in adolescence. This is the lesson of methodology that Freud taught us and that Lacan revived: to make the stone of scandal a stone of comparison on which to found a new clinic. (Cosenza, 2023, p. 234)

In this sense, anorexia functions as an Ur-symptom to our era. It unfolds within a landscape marked by the erosion of the symbolic in its “making of a father” where there is none in front the rise of a new ever devouring mother: the market. In the grammar of today’s discourse—with its saturated, repetitive mandates to enjoy—and where castration and lack are denied outright.

The anorexic registers this with uncanny precision. She is exposed to surplus demands and the confused tongues of a world that no longer distinguish between the object of need and the object of love. She has, somehow, no words for it—whether because the parental Other or the Other per se has rejected her insertion into the symbolic. Much like the contemporary subject, in her expulsion from the symbolic order, her body becomes the only remaining terrain where coherence might be attempted. She is, in this sense, fully satisfied with “nothing”—the persistent presence of nothing around which she coheres. And this places her alongside the contemporary subject, though with a slight semantic twist: the anorexic is satisfied with /through nothing, while the contemporary subject is satisfied by nothing. That is, while she feels “full”, she is thrown into the metonymic carrousel of objects that promise satisfaction but deliver none.

If the anorexic is the terrorist of desire—her refusal a ticking bomb strapped to her body—then the contemporary subject is its soldier: a soldier in a war he cannot win, a war he cannot control.

As these new channels that promise to regulate emotion and anxiety without the detour of speech continue to be established we might lean on Cosenza for a theorization of this new “orthopedics of jouissance” as today’s discursive solutions become our ailments too. A striking, even aberrant, example of this pharmacological paradigm (recalling that pharmakon means both poison and remedy) is the way weight-loss drugs are marketed today.

As of 2024, Novo Nordisk—the pharmaceutical company behind the GLP-1 agonists Ozempic and Wegovy, originally developed to treat Type 2 diabetes—has become the most valuable publicly traded company in Europe. It has surpassed corporate giants like Shell Oil in size and revenue and has contributed to a 2% increase in Denmark’s gross domestic product. To contextualize its scale: Novo Nordisk’s valuation now exceeds the combined worth of Airbus, Lufthansa, and British Airways (Nelson, 2024, 2025; Rampell, 2024; Tolentino, 2023).

These “blockbuster” drugs have reshaped public discourse around the body and appetite. In 2023 alone, over 65% of Ozempic and Wegovy prescriptions in the U.S. were issued to non-diabetic patients seeking, solely, weight loss (Tolentino, 2023). GLP-1 drugs mimic a naturally occurring gut hormone that slows gastric emptying and suppresses hunger signals—effectively muting the bodily “noise” of appetite. And despite the fact that they require lifelong administration and were approved after relatively short clinical trials, demand has surged, mostly so, in the United States, a country profoundly polarized over vaccines and the aura of big Pharma. But the demand for Ozempic and Wegovy speaks to a kinder reception than that of vaccines, their demand has generated shortages, media frenzies, and even absurd debates, such as airline companies reporting a measurable reduction in aircraft weight (Blum, 2024a, 2024b, 2025a, 2025b; Blum & Smith, 2025; Kessler, 2025; Kolata, 2024a, 2024b, 2024c, 2025; LaGorce, 2025; Lamas, 2024; Snow, 2025; Szalavitz, 2024). In “The Ozempic Era,” Jia Tolentino (2023) reports that as of 2022, nearly forty thousand new prescriptions for GLP-1 drugs were being written every week; the number has more than doubled as of today as Novo Nordisk has published 17 billion dollars of revenue solely from Ozempic sales in its public Novo Nordisk annual report, amounting to a 26% growth in revenue every year since GLP-1 commercialization (Novo Nordisk, 2024). Subscription models for GLP-1 prescriptions have proliferated, taking to bankruptcy longstanding companies like Weight Watchers. Within the media chatter, a mythology of unintended benefits has emerged: users report being weaned off alcoholism, gambling, extreme sports addictions, porn. Off-label applications abound—Parkinson’s, heart disease, Alzheimer’s—extending the reach of the mythic “silver bullet.” While the drug’s clinical intent is to control diabetes and its related physical deterioration, its primary and most profitable use is weight loss—promising up to a 20% reduction in body mass (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2023; Nelson, 2024, 2025; Wilding et al., 2021; Novo Nordisk, 2024).
But perhaps, most interesting to psychoanalysis is that the most compelling and universally reported effect is the quieting of mental noise. Users describe a sudden, unfamiliar relief: a constant feeling of fullness—a fullness that goes beyond the stomach, a fullness one might guess, familiar to the anorexic. The addictive appeal, then, is twofold, control and relief: a suspension of the nagging psychic and somatic chatter once considered intrinsic to the experience of having, or more precisely “being had” by a body.

In Cosenza’s (2023) terms, the anorexic operates in “defense against the dis-being that life implies” (p. 160). Today’s markets, with their ever revolving fetishistic offerings of “objects of rapport,” promise precisely that: control over existence. The promise is unmistakably delivered as we succeed to cut desire off at its root—eliminating appetite, erasing the need to grapple with the body at one of its most conflictual sites: the forked path where appetite and desire converge, announcing perhaps, a defining trope of our times. As the metaphorical becomes increasingly literal in our era, one can only imagine the power jolt delivered to a subject who has been “freed from” appetite. One need only sit with an anorexic and try to unpack how her imaginary omnipotence is somehow a failing synecdoche of what is really at stake: autonomy, love, the weight of life itself.

Bibliography

Aviv, R. (2017, March 27). The trauma of facing deportation. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/03/the-trauma-of-facing-deportation

Aviv, R. (2022). Strangers to ourselves: Unsettled minds and the stories that make us. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Blum, D. (2024a, May 24). Ozempic cuts risk of chronic kidney disease complications, study
finds. The New York Times. https:/www.nytimes.com/2024/05/24/well/ozempic-kidney-disease-semaglutide.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Blum, D. (2024b, October 3). Can drugs like Ozempic treat the most common eating disorder? The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/03/well/ozempic-binge-eating.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Blum, D. (2025a, April 30). Wegovy could treat another chronic disease. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/30/well/wegovy-liver-disease-mash.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Blum, D. (2025b, February 12). Ozempic can curb drinking, new research shows. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/12/well/ozempic-alcohol-use.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Blum D., & Smith, D. G. (2025, January 31). To protect against Alzheimer’s, researchers look to
weight loss drugs. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/31/well/mind/ozempic-alzheimers.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Braunstein, N. (2006). El goce: Un concepto lacaniano [Jouissance: A Lacanian concept]. Paidós.

Cosenza, D. (2023). A Lacanian reading of anorexia (J. West, Trans.; F. Castrillón, Rev. ed.).
Routledge.

Han, B.-C. (2015). The burnout society (E. Butler, Trans.). Stanford University Press. (Original work published 2010)

Hornbacher, M. (1998). Wasted: A memoir of anorexia and bulimia. Harper Perennial.

Kessler, D. A. (2025, May 7). In a world of addictive foods, we need GLP-1s. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/07/opinion/ozempic-weight-loss-drugs.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Kolata, G. (2024a, April 3). An Ozempic relative slowed Parkinson’s Disease in a small study. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/03/health/parkinsons-ozempic-glp-1.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Kolata, G. (2024b, August 30). An obesity drug prevents covid deaths, study suggests. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/30/health/wegovy-covid-deaths.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Kolata, G. (2024c, October 30). Obesity drug shows promise in easing knee osteoarthritis pain. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/30/health/ozempic-wegovy-knee-pain-osteoarthritis.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Kolata, G. (2025, February 10). The physicians really are healing themselves, with Ozempic. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/10/health/doctors-ozempic-weight-loss.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Lacan, J. (1994). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IV: The object relation (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; A. Wilden, Trans.). W. W. Norton. (Original work delivered 1956–1957)

Lacan, J. (2014). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; A. R. Price, Trans.). Polity Press. (Original work delivered 1962–1963)

LaGorce, T. (2025, April 29). How Ozempic is shaping weddings. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/29/style/ozempic-weight-loss-drugs-weddings.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Lamas, D. J. (2024, September 16). Inflammation may be the root of our maladies. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/16/opinion/inflammation-theory-of-disease.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Nelson, E. (2024, April 20). It introduced Ozempic to the world. Now it must remake itself. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/20/business/ozempic-novo-nordisk-wegovy.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Nelson, E. (2025, February 2). Novo Nordisk annual sales jump on higher demand for obesity drugs. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/05/business/novo-nordisk-earnings-ozempic-wegovy.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Novo Nordisk. (2024). Annual report 2024: Strategic aspirations – Financials.
https://annualreport.novonordisk.com/2024/strategic-aspirations/financials.html

Rampell, C. (2024, December 31). Ozempic economics: How GLP-1s will disrupt the economy in 2025. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/12/31/ozempic-weight-loss-economy-2025/

Snow, J. (2025, June 12). In some Ozempic households the weight loss is contagious. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/12/well/ozempic-weight-loss-family.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Szalavitz, M. (2024, October 18). The breakthrough drug to conquer addiction: Ozempic? The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/18/opinion/addiction-ozempic-glp-1.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare

Tolentino, J. (2023, March 20). Will the Ozempic era change how we think about being fat and being thin? The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/27/will-the-ozempic-era-change-how-we-think-about-being-fat-and-being-thin U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2023). FDA label for Ozempic [Labeling information].
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2023/209637s020s021lbl.pdf?

Wilding, J. P. H., Batterham, R. L., Calanna, S., Davies, M., Van Gall, L. F., Lingvay, I., McGowan, B. M., Rosenstock, J., Tran, M. T. D., Wadden, T. A., Wharton, S., Yokote, K., Zeuthen, N., & Kushner, R. F. (2021). Once weekly semaglutide in adults with overweight or obesity. New England Journal of Medicine, 384(11), 989-1002. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183

Bio

Jimena Martí Haik is a psychoanalyst. She maintains a dual clinical practice in both San Francisco, California and Mexico City, her hometown. She studied Latin American literature and literary criticism as well as completed postgraduate studies in psychoanalytic theory and critical theory. Her analytical formation is Lacanian.

Jimena Martí Haik es psicoanalista. Sostiene una practica clínica dual tanto en San Francisco, California como en la Ciudad de Mexico, su ciudad natal. Tiene estudios universitarios en literatura latinoamericana y critica literaria así como estudios de postgrado en teoría psicoanalítica y teoría critica. Su formación analítica es de corte lacaniano.

Publication Date

November 11th, 2025

Share

Author details

Downloads

Information

  • Published on 2025-11-10
  • Peer Reviewed

Metrics

  • Views: 7
  • Downloads: 16

Citation

Download RIS Download BibTeX

File Checksums

(MD5)
  • HTML: 385448980c96b1e7def5b5a3f9fe0aea
  • PDF: 0059acc6175ecd0850de298879911d77

Table of Contents